Software Vault: The Gold Collection/Software Vault - The Gold Collection (American Databankers) (1993).ISO/cdr11/jfk123.zip/CHAP14

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                               Chapter 14
                        Congress and the People

The  last hope of the people to take back their government from the  PCG
is through Congress.  The executive branch is a captive of the PCG.  The
legislative  branch  has  no power in the situation.   Where  courts  or
judges  do  have  some small measure of power, as in  the  hearings  and
appeals for a new trial for James Earl Ray, they have been controlled by
the PCG.  The ruling of the judge in the Ray appeals case, for  example,
was  obviously a decision made for him by someone higher up.   He  ruled
that  Ray  could  not have a new trial after hearing a  vast  amount  of
evidence  of conspiracy and solid evidence that Percy Foreman had  duped
Ray into pleading guilty.

Unless a people's revolution comes along, and that hardly seems  likely,
the only possibility left is to hope that Congress can do it.  What  are
the odds?  From what has been pointed out so far, it is obvious that  if
Congress  is to expose the PCG, throw the rascals in jail, and wipe  the
slate  clean  to  seize the country back for the  people,  a  tremendous
battle will be required.  All of the forces of the PCG, including  their
friends  in  the House and Senate, will be focussed on  preventing  this
from  happening.   A  power base within both houses  would  have  to  be
created that could not only do battle with the PCG but that would not be
fooled  by  their myriad of fiendishly clever  techniques,  methods  and
stratagems.  It would have to be a power base that protected itself from
infiltration  and  usurpation of its own resources.  It  would  have  to
somehow  conquer  the  media control problem;   otherwise,  no  American
citizen would know what it was doing or what the battle was about.

How would such a battle start and such a power base be constructed?   An
important  step  would  be to purify the special  committee  created  by
either  resolution and to purify the staff.  Preventing infiltration  of
staff  by the PCG is especially important.  As mentioned in Chapter  12,
the  Church Committee staff and the Schweiker sub-committee  staff  were
infiltrated   by  the  PCG,  and  specifically  the  CIA.    A   leading
assassination researcher and former intelligence officer in the  Defense
Intelligence  Agency  who knew many, many CIA agents discovered  two  of
them  in  the Church Committee staff offices in the fall of  1975.   The
other  staff  members  had not been aware that these two  men  were  CIA
agents because they were "deep cover" agents.

This  problem is rather complex because there is always  great  pressure
from the House or Senate to create a balance on any appointed committee.
Thus  the  Church  committee was hamstrung by several  of  the  Senators
appointed  to be on it:  they were close friends and supporters  of  the
CIA  and  FBI.  Senators Goldwater and Tower, for example,  fought  very
hard  to  block  any efforts to have the  entire  committee  investigate
potential CIA or FBI involvement in domestic assassinations.  This  does
not  necessarily mean that Goldwater and Tower are members of the  inner
circle  of  the  PCG.  But it does mean that PCG members  who  know  who
killed  John Kennedy and why can influence Goldwater and Tower to  block
such efforts.

The  first step in the House or Senate might be floor voting because  of
the  tight control exercised by the PCG over the committee procedure  on
resolutions.   In  the House, for example, the Rules Committee  is  all-
powerful in determining which resolutions are brought to the floor.

Henry  Gonzalez introduced his resolution HR204 in 1975 and sent  it  to
the  rules  committee.   Nearly a year passed.  On March  18,  1976  Mr.
Gonzalez,  together  with  Mr. Downing, was tired of  waiting  for  some
action  by Chairman Madden and they took the issue to the floor  of  the
House  for discussion.[1]  By this time the two representatives had  125
co-sponsors  for  their  two resolutions (an  unusually  large  number).
Gonzalez and Downing had taken over the floor of the House for two hours
and had several supporting speakers.  No one rose in opposition.   Prior
to  that  time, Representative Sisk from California  and  Representative
Bolling  from West Virginia had been vehemently outspoken in  the  Rules
Committee  against both resolutions.  Madden, Sisk and Bolling all  left
the House before Downing and Gonzalez started speaking.

As  a result of Gonzalez's and Downing's efforts, Madden was  forced  by
Speaker  Albert  and other members of the House and by some of  his  own
constituents  to hold a formal hearing on the two resolutions  on  March
31,  1976.   The PCG controlled the hearing through  Sisk,  Bolling  and
Lott.   The  resolutions were tabled, subject to future  recall  by  the
chairman.  The vote was nine to six.  Representative Bolling was  called
into the hearing from the House floor to cast the ninth vote at the last
minute.   He heard none of the arguments.  He didn't have to.   The  PCG
had instructed him on how to vote.

This  event  is  described to illustrate how difficult it  would  be  to
overcome  the  control advantages on the side of the PCG.  Only  on  the
Senate or House floor might it be possible to equalize things.  The  two
events, the two hour discussion on the House floor on March 18, reported
by the "Congressional Record," and the hearing by the rules committee on
March  31  illustrate another problem Congress has combatting  the  PCG.
Not  one  of the major news media organizations reported  either  event.
Two hours on the House floor is an incredibly long time for any subject.
There were many reporters present from television, radio, newspapers and
press  services.  Mark Lane saw to that.  But nothing appeared  on  CBS,
NBC, ABC, or in "Time," "Newsweek," or the "New York Times."  Why?   The
answer  is obvious.  Very tight control over the news from the House  is
exercised by the PCG.

The  larger implication is there for all to see who want to  open  their
eyes.  Seeing it and believing it are two different things.  For  nearly
all Congressmen who still have faith in America, the whole point of this
book,  and the existence of a Power Control Group which  included  Ford,
Nixon,  Kissinger,  the  CIA,  the FBI, the  fifteen  major  news  media
management  level people, plus nearly anyone else of importance  in  the
executive  branch  and many Congressmen, is too much to  swallow.   They
would  rather  have  the whole thing go quietly away  than  face  up  to
something  that  gigantic.   And that is the real source  of  the  PCG's
strength, the unbelievability of it all.

                         Addendum to Chapter 14

Several  truly  historic and highly encouraging events occurred  in  the
months  of September and October, 1976 that could indicate a  change  in
the tide and power and control described in earlier chapters.

First,  on September 15, a coalition of representatives from  the  Black
Caucus,  Henry  Gonzalez and Thomas Downing managed  to  get  Resolution
H1540  through the House Rules Committee.  Mark Lane, Coretta  King  and
others  were responsible for creating pressures that  finally  convinced
Speaker  Carl  Albert, Chairman Tom Madden of the  Rules  Committee  and
others that this was necessary and desirable.  The new resolution,  made
up  of  parts of the Downing and Gonzalez resolutions  plus  input  from
Representative  Walter  Fauntroy  from the Black  Caucus  called  for  a
special 12-person committee to reopen the JFK and Dr. King cases and any
other deaths that the committee might decide to investigate.

The  Rules  Committee  voted  nine to  four  in  favor.   Representative
Bolling, who perhaps unknowingly had lent his support to the  opposition
in the earlier vote, was an important swing vote and actually introduced
the  resolution in the meeting.  The position of the nine who voted  for
the resolution was more than vindicated two days later, when the  House,
by the extraordinary vote of 280 to 64, passed the resolution.   History
was  made.  On that day cheers should have gone up from several  hundred
dedicated  researchers  around the world, and the  Power  Control  Group
should have begun looking for rocks to crawl under.

The  real war was only beginning, however.  The "New York Times"  barely
reported  the event, did not mention the vote, and buried the  story  in
the  middle  of  another story with one-half inch in  one  column.   The
"Washington  Star"  and  "Post" carried larger stories  and  the  "White
Plains  Reporter  Dispatch" made it a first page  headline  story.   The
PCG's media control slipped a bit.

The  next  hurdle  was for Downing, Gonzalez and  Fauntroy  to  convince
Albert  that  the chairman of the new committee for 1977 should  be  Mr.
Gonzalez  since  Mr.  Downing had  announced  his  retirement.   Because
elections  were being held in November, Mr. Albert named Mr. Downing  as
chairman for the balance of 1976, with Mr. Gonzalez as next in line.  He
also  let it be known to the press that Mr. Gonzalez would be  the  best
choice to head the committee next year.

Mr.  Albert then named ten other members of the committee for  the  1976
period.  Four of them, Fauntroy, Burke, Stokes and Ford, were members of
the Black Caucus.  Stewart McKinney, Representative from Connecticut, is
a well known supporter of the truth.  Those five, together with  Downing
and  Gonzalez,  could  probably be counted on to try to  arrive  at  the
truth.   The other five representatives--Dodd from  Connecticut,  Preyer
from  Tennessee, Devine from Ohio, Thone from Nebraska and Talcott  from
California--were  unknown  quantities.  If the PCG theory holds  up,  at
least  one  of  them,  and  perhaps  two,  will  turn  out  to  be   PCG
representatives.

The  next event of significance occurred on October 4 when  Mr.  Downing
named Richard A. Sprague, former district attorney from Philadelphia and
fearless prosecutor of the Yablonski murderers, as executive director of
the committee's staff.  The main significance of this event was who  was
not  named.  Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., was in strong contention, but  he
was not selected because of suspicions that he might be a CIA agent  and
also because of conflicts of interests among his clientele.  Fensterwald
represented  Otto  Otepka, James McCord, James Earl Ray and  Andrew  St.
George,  among others.  There is certainly a strong CIA flavor  and  PCG
influence  among  his clients.  Whether or not Bud  Fensterwald  himself
works for the CIA or the PCG, his rejection as executive director was  a
healthy  sign  that  the  committee might be  able  to  go  through  the
purification process described as essential in Chapter 14.

Richard  A.  Sprague  had  his hands full  attempting  to  separate  PCG
applicants  for staff positions from non-PCG members.  The  PCG,  during
the same time period (September and October) these historic events  were
taking  place, was very active in spreading its second line  of  defense
information.   "Castro  did  it in revenge"  stories  began  popping  up
everywhere.   Jack  Anderson  was revived to back  up  the  strategy  by
publishing another of his "Castro did it" columns.
____________________
[1] House Resolution 204 -- Henry Gonzalez
    House Resolution 498 -- Thomas Downing